Calvin's Goatee

Reid on the Imitation of God: Famous Last Words

If it be true that piety, justice, benevolence, wisdom, temperance, [and] fortitude, are in their own nature the most excellent and most amiable qualities of a human creature; that vice has an inherent turpitude which merits disapprobation and dislike; these truths cannot be hid from him whose understanding is infinite, whose judgment is always according to truth, and who must esteem everything according to its real value.

The Judge of all the earth, we are sure, will do right. He has given to men the faculty of perceiving the right and the wrong of conduct, as far as is necessary to our present state, and of perceiving the dignity of the one, and the demerit of the other; and surely there can be no real knowledge or real excellence in man, which is not in his Maker.

We may therefore justly conclude, that what we know in part, and see in part of right and wrong, he sees perfectly; that the moral excellence which we see and admire in some of our fellow-creatures, is a faint but true copy of that moral excellence, which is essential to his nature; and that to tread the path of virtue is the true dignity of our nature, an imitation of God, and the way to obtain his favour.

- Thomas Reid
  Essays on the Active Powers of Man
  Essay V.vii.8

Note: These are the closing words of the Active Powers, and the last words Reid ever published. That last paragraph just kills me. Not even Aquinas has laid bare the beauty of intellectualism so well.

Reid on the Need for Goals

Mortification and self-denial are found not in the paths of virtue only; they are common to every road that leads to an end, be it ambition, or aravice, or even pleasure itself. Every man who maintains an uniform and consitent character, must sweat and toil, and often struggle with his present inclination.

A dog that is made for the chase cannot enjoy the happiness of a dog without that exercise. Keep him within doors, feed him with the most delicious fare, give him all the pleasures his nature is capable of, he soon becomes a dull, torpid, unhappy animal. No enjoyment can supply the want of that employment which nature has made his chief good. Let him hunt, and neither pain, nor hunger, nor fatigue, seem to be evils. Deprived of his exercise, he can relish nothing. Life itself becomes burdensome.

It is no disparagement to the human kind to say, that man, as well as the dog, is made for hunting, and cannot be happy but in some vigorous pursuit. He has indeed nobler game to pursue than the dog, but he must have some pursuit, otherwise life stagnates, all the faculties are benumbed, the spirits flag, and his existence becomes an unsupportable burden.

Even the foxhunter, who has no higher pursuit than his dogs, has more enjoyment than he who has no pursuit at all. He has an end in view, and this invigorates his spirits, make him despise pleasure, and bear cold, hunger and fatigue, as if they were no evils.

Manet sub Jove frigido
Venator, tenerae conjugis immemor;
Seu visa et catulis cerva fidelibus
Seu rupit teretes Marsus aper plagas.

- Thomas Reid
  Essays on the Active Powers of Man
  Essay III.iii.8

Reid on the Good Effects of Society

Without Society, and the intercourse of kind affection, man is a gloomy, melancholy, and joyless being. His mind oppressed with cares and fears, he cannot enjoy the balm of sound sleep; in constant dread of impending danger, he starts at the rustling of a leaf. His ears are continually upon the stretch, and every zephyr brings some sound that alarms him.

When he enters into society, and feels security in the good affection of friends and neighbors, it is then only that his fear vanishes, and his mind is at ease. His courage is raised, his understanding is enlightened, and his heart dilates with joy.

Human society may be compared to a heap of embers, which, when placed asunder, can retain neither their light nor heat, amidst the surrounding elements; but when brought together they mutually give heat and light to each other; the flame breaks forth, and not only defends itself, but subdues everything around it

- Thomas Reid
  Essays on the Active Powers of Man
  Essay III.ii.4

Note: I'm working my way through the Active Powers at present, so there will probably be a lot of Reid in the near future.

Reid on Lobsters & Cheese (also Taste & Judgment)

Something that is worth pursuing must have worth either intrinsically, on its own account, or as a means of procuring something intrinsically valuable. It’s obvious that we use judgment in discovering what means are fit for attaining what ends; I think all philosophers agree about this. But some philosophers don’t agree that it is also the role of judgment to appreciate the value of an end, or the preference due to one end above another. In determining what is good or bad, and among different goods which is best, they think we must be guided not by judgment but by some natural or acquired taste that makes us like one thing and dislike another.

Thus if one man prefers cheese to lobsters and another lobsters to cheese, it is pointless (say these philosophers) to apply judgment to find out which is right. Similarly, if one man prefers pleasure to virtue, and another virtue to pleasure, this is a matter of taste, and judgment has nothing to do with it. This seems to be the opinion of some philosophers.

I can’t help having the opposite opinion. I think we may form a judgment both in the question about cheese and lobsters, and in the more important one about pleasure and virtue. When one man gets more enjoyment from the taste of cheese and another from lobsters, I agree that this difference doesn’t bring in judgment; it depends only on the constitution of the palate. But if we want to know which has the better taste, I think the answer must come from judgment; and that one doesn’t need much judgment to come up with an answer that is quite certainly right, namely: the two tastes are equally good, and the men do equally well in preferring what suits their palate and their stomach.

Indeed, I think that the men themselves will agree perfectly in their judgment that both tastes are on an equal footing, and that neither has a just claim to preference. So it seems that in this case the role of taste is very different from that of judgment, and that men who differ most in taste, may agree perfectly in their judgment, even regarding the tastes in which they differ.

To make the other case parallel with this, it must be supposed that the two men — the one who puts pleasure above virtue, and the one who reverses that order — agree in their judgment, and that neither sees any reason to prefer one course of life to the other.
If this is supposed, I shall grant that neither of these persons has reason to condemn the other. Each chooses according to his taste in matters which he judges not to involve a better and a worse.

But we should note that this supposition will be wrong if the case involves people, or indeed moral agents of any kind. Someone who can’t see the obligation to be virtuous, when be uses his best judgment, may be called a ‘man’ but he isn’t really one. He is incapable either of virtue or of vice, and is not a moral agent.

- Thomas Reid
  Essays on the Active Powers of Man
  Essay II.ii

Note: This is why I love Reid so much.

We interrupt this program...

I'm going to Memphis for the week, and won't be back to posting till next Wednesday.

Until then indulge yourself with what I consider the best written & produced history podcast to date: Mike Duncan's The History of Rome.

I cannot recommend this podcast highly enough. From what I can tell Mike Duncan is just a guy who loves Roman history and has a knack for concise, conversational language. And thanks to the internet, we can all benefit from his pithy little lessons on history, politics, and geography. These are so good that I now look forward to washing dishes or picking up around the house because they give me a perfect excuse to check in on the Gallic Wars.

The podcasts are about 10-15 minutes a piece, but there are over 100 of them. Getting them in order can be a bit tricky. One way is to go to his website. Below is the link to his first post (start at the bottom). Or, if you prefer to wrangle with iTunes, I've supplied the Podcast link too. I had to do a little info editing to get it all in order but it's well worth it.

See you on the other side.

iTunes
Website Link

Hume on Perseverence in Philosophy

But before I launch out into those immense depths of philosophy, which lie before me, I find myself inclin'd to stop a moment in my present station, and to ponder that voyage, which I have undertaken, and which undoubtedly requires the utmost art and industry to be brought to a happy conclusion. Methinks I am like a man, who having struck on many shoals, and having narrowly escap'd shipwreck in passing a small frith, has yet the temerity to put out to sea in the same leaky weather-beaten vessel, and even carries his ambition so far as to think of compassing the globe under these disadvantageous circumstances. My memory of past errors and perplexities, makes me diffident for the future. The wretched condition, weakness, and disorder of the faculties, I must employ in my enquiries, encrease my apprehensions. And the impossibility of amending or correcting these faculties, reduces me almost to despair, and makes me resolve to perish on the barren rock, on which I am at present, rather than venture myself upon that boundless ocean, which runs out into immensity. This sudden view of my danger strikes me with melancholy; and as 'tis usual for that passion, above all others, to indulge itself; I cannot forbear feeding my despair, with all those desponding reflections, which the present subject furnishes me with in such abundance.

- David Hume
  A Treatise Of Human Nature
  Book I.vii

Editor's Note: Hume's bravery (or foolishness depending on your disposition) is most evident when you read this passage while holding the Treatise in your hands. After acknowledging the possible pointlessness of his inquiry, Hume writes two more books of equal or greater length to book I, which closes with this passage. The Treatise was never accounted a work of much merit during Hume's lifetime. Today it is considered - rightly, I think, despite its problems - one of the most original and insightful works in the history of philosophy.

Sextus Empiricus on Assent and Belief

When we say that the Sceptics do not hold beliefs, we do not take 'belief' in the sense in which some say, quite generally, that belief is acquiescing in something; for Sceptics assent to the feelings forced upon them by appearances - for example, they would not say, when heated or chilled, 'I think I am not heated (or: chilled)'. Rather, we say that they do not hold beliefs in the sense in which some say that belief is assent to some unclear object of investigation in the sciences, for Pyrrhonists do not assent to anything unclear.

Not even in uttering the Sceptical phrases about unclear matters... do they hold beliefs. For if you hold beliefs, then you posit as real the things you are said to hold beliefs about; but Sceptics posit these phrases not as necessarily being real. For they suppose that, just as the phrase 'Everything is false' says that it too, along with everything else, is false..., so also 'In no way more' says that it too, along with everything else is not more so that not so, and hence cancels itself along with everything else. And we say the same of other Sceptical phrases. Thus, if people who hold beliefs posit as real the things they hold beliefs about, while Sceptics utter their own phrases in such a way that they are implicity cancelled by themselves, they cannot be said to hold beliefs in uttering them.

But the main point is this: in uttering these phrases they say what is apparent to themselves and report their own feelings without holding opinions, affirming nothing about external objects.

- Sextus Empiricus
  Outlines of Scepticism
  I.vii

Editor's Note: I'm not a Sceptic, but I love this little book so much for its ingenuity. If you like philosophy and logic puzzles, you cannot read Sextus without smiling at least once a page. This is philosophy at its most readable.

Ferguson on the Necessity of Ingenuity in Commerce and Academics

Among the occupations that may be enumerated, as tending to exercise the invention, and to cultivate the talents of men, are the pursuits of accommodation and wealth, including all the different contrivances which serve to increase manufactures, and to perfect the mechanical arts. But it must be owned, that as the materials of commerce may continue to be accumulated without any determinate limit, so the arts which are applied to improve them, may admit of perpetual refinements. No measure of fortune, or degree of skill, is found to diminish the supposed necessities of human life; refinement and plenty foster new desires, while they furnish the means, or practise the methods, to gratify them.

In the result of commercial arts, inequalities of fortune are greatly increased, and the majority of every people are obliged by necessity, or at least strongly incited by ambition and avarice, to employ every talent they possess. After a history of some thousand years employed in manufacture and commerce, the inhabitants of China are still the most laborious and industrious of any people on the surface of the earth.

Some part of this observation may be extended to the elegant and literary arts. They too have their materials, which cannot be exhausted, and proceed from desires which cannot be satiated. But the respect paid to literary merit is fluctuating, and matter of transient fashion. When learned productions accumulate, the acquisition of knowledge occupies the time that might be bestowed on invention. The object of mere learning is attained with moderate or inferior talents, and the growing list of pretenders diminishes the lustre of the few who are eminent. When we only mean to learn what others have taught, it is probable, that even our knowledge will be less than that of our masters. Great names continue to be repeated with admiration, after we have ceased to examine the foundations of our praise: and new pretenders are rejected, not because they fall short of their predecessors, but because they do not excel them; or because, in reality, we have, without examination, taken for granted the merit of the first, and cannot judge of either.

After libraries are furnished, and every path of ingenuity is occupied, we are, in proportion to our admiration of what is already done, prepossessed against farther attempts. We become students and admirers, instead of rivals; and substitute the knowledge of books, instead of the inquisitive or animated spirit in which they were written.

The commercial and lucrative arts may continue to prosper, but they gain an ascendant at the expence of other pursuits. The desire of profit stifles the love of perfection. Interest cools the imagination, and hardens the heart; and, recommending employments in proportion as they are lucrative, and certain in their gains, it drives ingenuity, and ambition itself, to the counter and the workshop.

- Adam Ferguson
  Ferguson: An Essay on the History of Civil Society
  V.iii

Editor's Note: I thought about just posting the inner part of this quote - the criticism of declining academic pursuit - but its enveloping criticism of debased economic ambition is more than a parenthesis. How many wonderful inventions and innovations have we lost to Wall Street recruiters and the desire for certain wealth? If my conversations with Princeton students give an accurate impression, the number is tragically high.

Thomas on the Character of Faith

Whether this is a fitting definition of faith: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not?" (Hebrews 11:1)

[...] The relationship of the act of faith to the object of the intellect, considered as the object of faith, is indicated by the words, "evidence of things that appear not," where "evidence" is taken for the result of evidence. For evidence induces the intellect to adhere to a truth, wherefore the firm adhesion of the intellect to the non-apparent truth of faith is called "evidence" here. Hence another reading has "conviction," because to wit, the intellect of the believer is convinced by Divine authority, so as to assent to what it sees not. Accordingly if anyone would reduce the foregoing words to the form of a definition, he may say that "faith is a habit of the mind, whereby eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to what is non-apparent."

In this way faith is distinguished from all other things pertaining to the intellect. For when we describe it as "evidence," we distinguish it from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, which do not make the intellect adhere to anything firmly; when we go on to say, "of things that appear not," we distinguish it from science and understanding, the object of which is something apparent; and when we say that it is "the substance of things to be hoped for," we distinguish the virtue of faith from faith commonly so called, which has no reference to the beatitude we hope for.

- Thomas Aquinas
  Summa Theologica
  II-II.4.1

Editor's Note: Sorry for the unannounced hiatus. I've been in heavy writing mode. Things should be back to normal now.

Editor's Note 2: I really love this quote from Thomas. It's worth reading a few times; especially the last sentence of the first paragraph.

Anderson on the Limits of Economic Valuation

Liberal theories of justice tend to criticize the way the market distributes income, while mostly ignoring its impact on the other goods it distributes. Libertarianism and welfare economics represent most expansions of the domain of market norms as gains for freedom and welfare. This is partly due to the fact that they represent freedom and welfare in the same limited terms to which the market is responsive. They take up the perspective of market relations on these goods and hence are blind to the ways markets fail to realize more adequate conceptions of them. This blindness can be traced to three fundamental errors in the theory of value. First, preference orientation: Libertarians and welfare economists tie freedom and welfare to the expression or satisfaction of give desires, rather than to the expression of rational attitudes. Second, individualism: they suppose that individuals are self-sufficient in their capacities to exercise freedom and to form and express their values, independent of their relations to others. Third, commodity fetishism: they tend to conceive of freedom or welfare in terms of the possession and use of exclusive goods, ignoring the expressive dimension of action and hence the meanings of relations among people that we establish in governing our interactions by market norms.

- Elizabeth Anderson
  Value in Ethics and Economics
  p. 164